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Abstract: Leaving unstated it’s probably many connec-
tions with Chinese traditional cultures, it [this paper] seeks 
to articulate some main theses of the tradition that, owing 
as much (if not more) to Hebrew prophets as to Greek phi-
losophers, is foundational for a critical appropriation and 
defence of authentic human rights. Leaving many impor-
tant human rights unstated, it tries to identify the rational 
foundations for them all, in nine theses.
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Resumen: Sin llegar a afirmar que es probable que haya 
muchas conexiones con las culturas tradicionales chinas, 
la pretensión que alberga este trabajo es articular algunas 
tesis básicas de la tradición tributaria (quizás, principal-
mente) de los profetas hebreos y de los filósofos griegos, 
que es fundamental tanto para una apropiación crítica 
como para la defensa de los derechos humanos autén-
ticos. Sin mencionar muchos derechos humanos impor-
tantes, pretende indentificar los fundamentos racionales 
comunes a todos ellos, a partir de nueve tesis.
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Natural Law: Practical Reason and Creative Information
This address has nine main theses, each interspersed with many others:
 I. In investigating facts, one finds reasons to choose an honest self-discipline.
 II. Deliberating, one finds reasons similarly directing one to other intrinsic goods.
 III. Taken integrally, these goods and principles acquire the force of moral precepts.
 IV. Those precepts, natural moral law, depict our nature in its flourishing.
 V. Nature and natures are best explained by free, intelligent transcendent Creation.
 VI. Creation and other gifts past and present deserve our gratitude.
 VII. Natural moral law and historical revelation are two channels of information.
 VIII. Secular and spiritual communities are distinct and respectfully self-governing.
 IX. Natural moral law defines human rights but rightfully extends beyond them.
© John Finnis
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i. in inVestigating FaCts, one FinDs Reasons to Choose 
an honest selF DisCiPline
C onsider questions, that is, questioning, specifically the first experiences we have had, each one of us, of consciously raising questions of fact, and thinking about possible and available evidence (clues), possible and avail-
able answers and explanations. Within that experience, a further set of questions 
emerged or emerge, alongside the initial question, the one that started the in-
vestigation. These further questions were or are something like: What evidence 
shall I seek, and what shall I ignore and what retain, what shall I treat as the 
answer – an answer I want, or that others want me to accept, or only the answer 
which the evidence supports as true? For if I am thinking honestly and carefully, 
trying to attain a right answer, the truth about the facts that are my initial ques-
tion’s subject-matter, I become aware of two elements of my situation.
One element is the constraints or disciplines of honesty or inner sincerity 
(about what the evidence is, what really can and cannot be inferred from it), 
and the demands of diligence or care in considering it and reasoning about it. 
Those constraints, disciplines and demands formulate themselves in my mind as 
propositions about what I ought and ought not to do in investigating my ques-
tion and how to answer it well (honestly and carefully).
The other element is implicit in those «oughts» and «ought nots». It is 
my freedom to respect them or violate them, deliberately or carelessly. This 
is a true freedom of choice, choice between alternative attractive, but incom-
mensurably attractive options: to accept inadequate answers that are conven-
ient for my prejudices or my popularity, or instead to carry on searching, if 
I can, towards answers that, although inconvenient, are (as best I can judge) 
true, the best explanation of the evidence; and if I cannot carry on searching, 
not to pretend to myself that untrue answers are true. A choice between the 
sincere and the insincere, in searching.
Such elements of private experience are among the originating moments 
in our awareness of the natural law, and of practical reason, and of what prac-
tical reasoning is about. The activity I was describing was «theoretical» or fac-
tual thinking, investigation of some question of natural science or of history or, 
later in life, of comparative law or of philosophy... Practical reasoning is about 
deliberating towards free choice between alternative, incompatible desirable 
proposals (options) for my choice – alternative desirable states of affairs, sets 
of ends and means, for me to choose between and then put the chosen option 
into action to try to achieve the chosen state of affairs. The alternative op-
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tions, in the experience of investigating facts, were (A) my reaching, with ease 
and applause, an unsatisfactory but popular answer or (B) my discovering, by 
investigating as carefully and honestly as I ought to, the unwelcome but correct 
or probably correct answer to the question that I raised and then pursued by 
the self-disciplined activity of thinking (questioning, evidence-gathering, rea-
soning, testing, and judging...) as one ought.
The standards or norms that articulate those oughts in propositional form 
are standards or norms of natural law. In considering how they apply to one’s 
own activity of investigation, one is exercising one’s conscience. That is no more 
and no less than a name for the set of judgments one makes – each one of us 
makes – about what those standards are, and how they apply to the activity in 
which I am engaged (in this instance an investigation of facts), or any activity 
in which I might be engaged, or, looking back, any activity in which I was at 
some time in the past engaged. We can talk about conscience without using the 
word «conscience»; it is a word for which we have other words, such as, one’s 
practical reason, one’s thinking about, and judging, what one should (or should 
not) choose – perhaps in general, perhaps here and now – or about what one 
should have chosen at some time in the past when one chose not to follow one’s 
conscientious judgment and instead to adopt some other attractive option like 
a dishonest or careless but comfortable resolution of the investigation.
These standards or norms are internal to one’s thinking. In that sense, 
they have their origin in one’s mind and thought. But in another sense, they 
stand over against one’s thinking, as a critique of that thinking whenever it 
seems likely to deviate from them. One should not judge them to be mere em-
anations from one’s psyche, like a dream or fantasy, nor treat them as a passing 
thought. They stand over and constrain one’s self, one’s subjectivity, as objec-
tive disciplines for coming to know, or to know more, about what is not at all 
a product of one’s thinking, namely (1) the whole vast world of realities that 
are what they are independently of one’s thinking, and (2) the whole domain 
of logical requirements of valid, non-fallacious reasoning, and (3) the whole 
domain of techniques and technologies that work, successfully, for those who 
understand and apply them, but not for the ignorant, the daydreamers and the 
undisciplined, and (4) the whole domain of choices and actions that respect 
practical reason’s norms and principles for good human choices. These are 
norms whose initial constraints, disciplines and demands upon me relate di-
rectly to the good of truth and knowledge of it. They tell me, directively, what 
I need to do, must do, with honesty and care, honorably, to reach the truth in 
any and all these four domains.
JOHN FINNIS
22 PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 82 / 2020/1
ii. DelibeRating, one FinDs Reasons similaRly DiReCting 
one to otheR intRinsiC gooDs
Truth (and knowledge of it) is not the only basic human good. It is not 
the only good that I can and do, effortlessly, understand to be good not sim-
ply or only as a means to other good states of affairs and ways of being, but 
as – also and more basically – intrinsically worthwhile, a human good is to be 
pursued and respected in my choices and actions for its own sake: good not pri-
marily as an object of thought, or «ideal», but rather, as embodied in actions 
and actual states of affairs, as elements of the wellbeing, the flourishing, of real 
persons, myself and others.
The proposition that truth and knowledge of it is good and worthy of 
pursuit is not the only first principle of practical reason, that is, of thinking 
about what to choose and do. Other equally primary, equally basic, equally 
obvious first principles include:
– the good of human life and health;
– the good of friendly association with other human persons in many 
kinds of good and needful association;
– the good of mastery, ludic or artistic or purposeful, over matter;
– the good of marital commitment to another person in which, with me, 
can, as father and mother, procreate children whose conception super-
venes on marital intercourse that is expressive of our commitment to 
each other as wife and husband, children to whose nurturing, upbring-
ing and education we are committed as father and mother without 
limitation of time;
– the good of associating in awe, gratitude and hope with the creative 
mind and will to which this address will soon be turning;
– and the good of choosing and acting upon immediate and long-term 
priorities among these goods – and among alternative ways of respect-
ing and promoting them – in a reasonable way: the good of practical 
reasonableness for its own sake.
That these are goods for any human person is in each case a truth that we 
do not invent, but find, discover, come to understand when we attend to and 
consider the possibilities that lie open to us for our choice and action. In each 
case, the principle that identifies and directs us to one of these intrinsic goods 
is a principle we find, not invent. Each of these principles’ directiveness, its 
normativity for our deliberations towards choice, is not a directiveness that 
we chose, or that someone or some group chose for us, but a truth that we 
NATURAL LAW: PRACTICAL REASON AND CREATIVE INFORMATION
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 82 / 2020/1 23
discovered 1 when we considered these possibilities and the alternatives to them: 
disease and death; ignorance, confusion and falsity; egotism and disharmony; 
passivity and indiscipline; sterility and the cessation of our humankind; indif-
ference to the origins and destiny of the cosmos and of our own consciousness, 
freedom of choice and responsibility; arbitrariness and subjection to passions 
rebelling against or enslaving reason...
Thus, in the way we come to know them, and in the way they wait to be 
discovered and when discovered are directive and normative, these goods or 
needs, like the corresponding principles of theoretical (fact-seeking) reason, are 
natural, and their normativity is already a kind of «natural law». That is to say, 
they constitute a set of directives internal to our inmost, most personal thinking, 
not inventions or projections or constructs of that thinking but pointers towards 
ways of life and states of existence that align us to reality and truly do constitute 
the essential elements of human flourishing. And this is the case even when 
the discovery of them is implicit and is expressed indirectly and in another lan-
guage. First principles can do their directive work, in thought and deliberation, 
without being articulated «clearly and distinctly». One usually does not work 
forward from them into morality and culture but rather discovers them reflec-
tively as the principles that are at the root of an adequate explanation and justi-
fication of any of the morally sound ways of life that one has become aware of.
iii. taken integRally, these gooDs anD PRinCiPles aCquiRe 
the FoRCe oF moral PReCePts
Their normativity is real and indispensable. But it is not yet moral nor-
mativity. These principles of practical reason provide moral thinking with the 
source of its normativity, of moral normativity, and with much of its content. 
But the sense (intelligibility) and force of moral principles, precepts, consid-
erations, and conclusions is given not by any one or more of the first practical 
principles considered one by one. That intelligibility and force is supplied by 
taking the directiveness in each of them together with all the others integrally, 
that is to say without sub-rational limitations, especially sub-rational limita-
tions exclusively to myself or exclusively to some arbitrarily selected subset of 
human persons.
1 See the discussion of questions in Finnis, J., «The young child’s questions», Reason in Action: 
Collected Essays., vol. I, Oxford University Press, England, 2011, pp. 1-12.
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The integral directiveness of the set of first practical principles point me 
towards the fulfilment or flourishing of all human persons and groups. They 
do not direct me to make that flourishing of all human persons and groups 
a direct object of my choices, as if it were some feasible goal of purposeful 
disposition of means. Instead, their integral directiveness is articulated in each 
and all of the reasonable ways of respecting persons, and all reasonable prior-
itizations of care and effort, that we find stated in the principles and precepts 
of justice and courage and temperance. These are moral principles and pre-
cepts, informing us how we need to deliberate, choose and act if we are to be 
practically reasonable, just and decent human persons. Morality is the set of 
requirements of respect for humanity, because humanity is what we are re-
specting and promoting and duly loving when we keep our choices compatible 
with integral human fulfilment.
iV. those PReCePts, natuRal moRal laW, DePiCt ouR natuRe 
(humanity) in its FlouRishing
To the extent that they live with fidelity to true moral precepts, in choice 
and in action, human persons are – unless circumstances are most adverse – 
flourishing instances and manifestations of human nature. This is human na-
ture, humanity, not simply in its capacities, radical, developing or developed, 
but in its flourishing. That is, I think another meaning of «humanity». Many 
of the moral precepts are precepts of justice. But justice concerns what I owe 
to others, and I also have duties to myself. «Love» – that is, wish the good of – 
«your neighbor as yourself».
Some of these duties are negative: not to try (intend) to destroy or dam-
age any basic human good in any person, not to choose kinds of acts that 
are contrary to the good of marriage, not to divide oneself by making one’s 
assertions lies. Others are affirmative (positive): to help others in their needs, 
above all by living out a coherent set of responsibilities to one’s family and 
other dependants, to one’s close neighbours and to one’s fellow workers and 
one’s economic or other vocational cooperative organization, and to one’s fel-
low-countrymen, and to all human persons anywhere whom one could help 
or keep safe by care or contribution of work or resources compatible with my 
prior responsibilities of the kind I have just mentioned.
The negative duties of justice and respect for human persons can be, in 
morality and in law, exceptionless. The affirmative duties or responsibilities 
NATURAL LAW: PRACTICAL REASON AND CREATIVE INFORMATION
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 82 / 2020/1 25
are always more or less contingent upon, and proportionate to, the circum-
stances – that is, to other competing responsibilities. Assessing these respon-
sibilities may require careful attention to the certain or probable or really 
possible side-effects and other consequences of my choice and action. But the 
morally required assessment can never be reasonably guided by a «principle» 
that what is morally right is what maximizes the overall net of pre-moral good. 
Many kinds of incommensurability make that theory of morality unreasona-
ble. I will mention only one illustration, in which only one of the basic human 
goods is at stake (I take and adapt the example from Bernard Williams in his 
debate with J.J.C. Smart about utilitarianism).
 In the open-ended life of an individual or group, consider the conse-
quences of choosing, for example, to try to kill  one innocent (non-threaten-
ing) person as part of a deal with terrorists to save 19 of the 20 they were about 
to kill; or the consequences of choosing to kill 19 as part of a deal to save one 
of the 20 whom the terrorists were about to kill. The consequences extend 
far beyond the saving of the 19, or of the one: they include the effects of the 
acting person becoming a certain kind of person, one ready to kill innocent 
(non-threatening) persons when that seems to him likely to have better con-
sequences. The consequences of him becoming that kind of person, acting or 
ready to act on that sort of policy, are incalculable. They are likely to be very 
bad, especially if his action, his policy, and his character are approved by others 
and become part of their characters and attitude to life. So, a consequentialist 
morality of trying to sum up and net off the pre-morally good consequenc-
es of my actions against the pre-morally bad is very unreasonable. A sound 
morality has firm precepts (and corresponding duties and rights) against in-
tentionally killing, commit adultery and other contra-marital acts, and perju-
ry, to accompany its many affirmative precepts requiring actions, productive 
or precautionary, seeking to achieve good consequences within some field or 
fields of responsibility that can reasonably be considered part of the particular 
acting person or group’s morally-shaped vocation or commitments, narrow or 
relatively wide.
That is the briefest summary of the natural moral law, or moral natural 
law. Anyone ready and willing to act on and in accordance with those precepts, 
affirmative as well as negative, has the moral virtues, the working-in-practice 
of the natural good of practical reasonableness (that Aquinas called the bonum 
rationis, the good of being reasonable) which when fully embraced is the moral 
virtue of practical reasonableness that the Greeks called phronesis and the Ro-
mans and their Latin-speaking successors pru dentia.
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V. natuRe anD natuRes aRe best exPlaineD by FRee, intelligent 
tRansCenDent CReation
So: practical truths that we find and do not make, do not invent, do not 
produce, are understood in the form of practical propositions. Those propo-
sitions, if followed out in their implications when taken all together, direct us 
that our actions favor and respect the goods in all human lives. These direc-
tives are more specifically normative and directive than when or if the propo-
sitions first were understood, one by one, as directing us to the good of truth, 
the good of life, the good of friendship, and so on. That was the framework of 
what I have said so far this morning.
Now consider the fact that we have these powers of understanding and rea-
son, and that these powers or capacities enable us to understand and affirm these 
and many other truths about our responsibilities. Consider at the same time the 
fact that those powers and capacities enable us to also understand and affirm the 
countless truths and realities of logic, and of nature itself – the universe and all 
it contains – insofar as it exists, as it massively does, independently of our un-
derstanding. Each of those great facts – about our power of understanding and 
about the truths and realities and goods it enables us to discover (not invent) – is 
a great source of wonder, a real marvel, a supremely interesting topic of inquiry 
and source of questions seeking explanations of these facts and realities.
 The progress made in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in 
the natural sciences both of biology and physics (most recently of nano-phys-
ics) and in the natural history of the universe (paleontology), has shown with 
ever greater clarity that the explanation developed first by the prophets of Is-
rael was an explanation greatly superior to the explanations developed by, for 
example, the Greek philosophers. Skeptical empiricists blocked fruitful em-
pirical science by postulating or proposing that everything is nothing but ma-
terial particles in random motion, eternally. More critical thinkers made vast 
progress by hypothesizing and affirming intelligible form(s) (as in design) to 
explain the motions of matter and presume a design-like intelligibility of sub-
stances, in which matter is dominated and shaped by form into substances in 
their various kinds or species or natures. But progress remained impaired by 
continuing assumptions about the eternity of the world and about the divinity 
of at least some stellar bodies. Never did the ancient Greeks break through the 
Hebrew prophetic insight that the universe, with its time, was created out of 
nothing, and so did not exist eternally but had a beginning, a genesis, and is 
not divine and contains no part or share of the one eternal God, who utterly 
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transcends the universe and is «in it» (and in every one of its parts) only as its 
primary and transcendent cause, effective through secondary causes in the way 
that St. Thomas Aquinas worked out against Islamic theologians for whom the 
sovereignty and free will of God excludes the possibility of investigating and 
predicting natural events and processes. No, said Aquinas, everything that hap-
pens – human free choices aside – is totally the result of natural causes whose 
pattern and effects can all be scientifically investigated (causes whose inter-
action in particular events includes, of course, a large measure of contingent 
coincidence and thus many causal events), while at the same time everything 
that happens is totally the result of transcendent divine causality 2. Here we see 
an important aspect of the meaning of «transcendent»: its primary causality 
does not subtract from or impair in any way the completeness and sufficiency 
of natural («secondary») causes and their natural effects. Totally by primary 
causality and totally by natural secondary causality.
The contemporary study of sub-atomic processes, of molecules great and 
small, and of cells and organisms converges in every one of those fields on the 
finding that what we call matter, and may reasonably continue to call matter, 
is at bottom no more and no less than processes or events dominated by informa-
tion, by pattern, form, and intelligibility. And the history of the universe, now 
well and verifiably understood as initiated by that astonishing singularity, that 
sheer beginning, popularly called the «Big Bang», shows that the universe’s 
creation involved no more and no less than the creation of the type of en-
ergy we call light and, along with light, the information which confers about 
light-energy, its forms, its directions, its substances – first elementary and then 
more complex but never infinitely complex: the number of chemical elements 
emergent from imploding stars is rather small: below 100, that can be extend-
able artificially to a number still well below 200.
And since the Big Bang is the initial union of created light and created 
information, we can see how far the prophet or prophets of Israel who com-
posed chapter 1 and the first four verses of chapter 2 of the book called Genesis 
were successful in understanding the mind and freely chosen action of the 
2 Summa contra Gentiles III, Ch. 70 [para. 8]. On the matters mentioned in the present and the 
next paragraph of this address, see Finnis, J., «On Anscombe’s ‘Royal Road’ to True Belief», 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 90, n. 2, 2016, pp. 347-68; also published as «Body, 
Soul and Information: on Anscombe’s ‘Royal Road’ to True Belief», in Luke Gormally, David 
Jones and Roger Teichman (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, St Andrews Studies 
in Philosophy: Imprint Academic, 2016, pp. 263-88.
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Creator when they wrote: «And God said» – notice: there is the information, 
put (like speech) into a form distinct from the speaker, and communicated – 
«Let there be light, and there was light». People used to be puzzled by the fact 
that in Genesis 1 the light is created several «days» before the sun. But that, 
as we now know, is a sober truth about the chronology of creation as we now 
know it from late 20th century cosmology.
The book called Genesis did not intend to give a natural-scientific account 
of the origin of the universe. But it did intend to repudiate myth and to give, 
instead of myth, a historical parable. A parable, in Hebrew, a mashal, intends 
to make a true comparison between the simple, concrete, imaginable elements 
of its story and certain realities of the human situation that are not recounted 
but evoked by that story. In a historical mashal, certain real sequences and 
causes and effects that occurred historically are evoked and reported, not di-
rectly but indirectly. An example of a historical mashal is the parable that was 
told to his disciples by the Rabbi from Nazareth as he approached Jerusalem 
for the last time before his execution, the parable of the wicked vine growers 
or husbandmen or tenant farmers. For that parable intended to and did con-
vey decisive elements of the true history of Israel – the history, in bare outline, 
of its dealings with its prophets and eventually with this prophetic Rabbi, the 
Teacher from Nazareth, the parable’s teller himself.
The three documents in which this historical parable appears, Matthew, 
Mark, and Luke, are not parables or mashalim, not even historical parables or 
mashalim. They, like their complementary document John, are historical state-
ments conveying what various eyewitnesses remembered, almost all about 
what that teller of parables and moral truths actually said, and did, by healings 
and other signs and wonders before and after his arrest, trial and execution, 
over the preceding period of three and a half years, in the Roman imperial 
province of Judea and the client-kingdom of Galilee and Perea, and some of 
the neighbouring territory in the empire.
Vi. CReation anD otheR giFts Past anD PResent DeseRVe ouR 
gRatituDe
The discovery – not an invention or projection – of the gigantic fact 
of Creation by an absolutely transcendent, eternal, simple, unchanging mind 
enables us to understand natural law – first practical principles, master moral 
principle, and general and specific moral precepts – in a deeper and more 
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adequate way. Now the fact that we understand those precepts and principles, 
and thus that law, can itself, that fact, be understood to be a kind of sharing, 
participation, in the mind of the Creator.
The choice to create, and to create this very universe rather than any of 
the countless possible alternatives, is a choice which involves no change in the 
eternal existing and self-understanding of the Creator but rather the greatest 
possible change in the created, the universe of creatures – the change from 
nothing to something and this something. That choice was carried into effect 
by imparting the information that establishes the various natures and all the 
natural activity of all those creatures. The cumulation of natural scientific in-
formation and understanding makes it now apparent that that communication 
of information was not complete in an all-at-once initial singularity but has 
been progressive over the approximately 14 thousand million years since that 
singularity. For that initial singularity can hardly have contained within it all the 
information which we see operative in two subsequent, not quite so instantane-
ous singularities: the emergence of life, each living cell, however rudimentary, 
being more complex than the entire universe of billions of galaxies that preced-
ed the first cell; and the emergence of rational animals capable of freely choos-
ing between intelligible alternative options or proposal for intentional action.
Indeed, the nature of a living animal which a person is, who can ask ques-
tions about anything – about the universe and creation, and about what to do 
with his or her own life, as a whole or this morning – is a nature so different 
from that of all other animals and inanimate creatures that it has been rea-
sonable, even before the discoveries of modern science, to infer that it is by 
a kind of individualized, special act that the eternal and unchanging Creator 
imparts to each human being, one by one, the information, the soul, that is the 
very form and actuality of his or her human life. When that soul’s informing 
of matter has developed this new human being’s radical capacities (the capac-
ities or potentialities that came, actually but entirely undeveloped, with or in 
his or her ensoulment), and developed them to such a degree that his or her 
own bodily life can sustain consciousness, thought and deliberation, then he or 
she can actually (not merely potentially) do all that I have been recalling this 
morning – all the questioning, understanding of opportunities and dangers, 
consideration of alternatives for action, understanding of the constraints, not 
invented or self-imposed but found and normative, of honesty and care in 
investigation, reflection, communication and deliberation.
And the natural response to discovering what one has thus been given, 
ultimately from nothing, is gratitude. That gratitude for Creation is an impor-
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tant element in the enhanced intelligibility and enhanced normativity of the 
natural moral law.
Indeed, even before the discovery of the transcendent Creator, natural 
gratitude is a significant element in an adequate understanding of the principles 
and precepts that one finds and does not invent, and in an appropriate response 
to them. For the I who discovers the intelligible goods of life, knowledge, mas-
tery over matter, friendship, and marriage, and who discovers the normativity 
of these goods as goods for me but equally for anyone like me – that is, for any 
human person – also discovers myself to have been the child of parents who 
brought me into being (Only much later does one discover that that bringing 
to be should result from an act expressive of the two parents’ free commitment, 
a commitment both to each other in marriage and to any child whose com-
ing-to-be might supervene upon that act (either as its intended effect or as an 
acceptable side effect of it). But even early on I know them as parents who by 
themselves or through their substitutes provided me with the means to live and 
grow and become the beneficiary of all the goods that I possess and share in 
and have the opportunity to possess, and share in and share out to others, in the 
open horizon of my future life. And I discover, too, that the language and all the 
other cultural riches of my people, resources like houses and harvests and hos-
pitals and highways that I find (or can hope to find) available to me – and cannot 
and do not myself invent – are all, for me, gifts to appreciate and be grateful for. 
That understanding of what I owe to others, of my debt to those others (as also 
to the Creator of all), is intrinsic to an adequate understanding of what it means 
to articulate, acknowledge, propose or assert a moral ought.
And that ought is, once again, natural in the sense that it is fully reasona-
ble, the outcome of correct understanding of our nature, our situation and its 
opportunities, to which we are directed, first by the first principles of practical 
reason and then by their reasonable interrelating – with each other and in the 
lives of others than ourselves – through the ideal or master moral principle of 
integral human fulfilment.
Vii. natuRal moRal laW anD histoRiCal ReVelation aRe tWo 
Channels oF information
By bringing Creation, after many billions of years, to the point where it 
could fittingly include bodily persons, the Creator introduced more than one 
new kind of reality into the universe.
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One new reality was the natural law in the sense that I have been discuss-
ing in this address: the principles and precepts that inform and direct, mind to 
mind, by being understood and freely accepted as normative guides to rational 
and reasonable choices and the actions that execute those choices. «Natural 
law», in that meaning of the phrase, is different from what we call the laws 
of nature. For laws of nature operate throughout the universe, informing and 
directing all its activities and substances, including our own character and dy-
namisms as animals, without having to be understood at all by the substances 
whose being and activity these laws inform and direct. But the natural law that 
works through understanding, directing choices without determining them 
or eliminating or even weakening the capacity to choose, immorally, against 
them, is a reality additional to the laws of nature.
A second new reality that in our universe became possible with the cre-
ation of human persons is a standing human capacity making possible the 
direct communication of information not simply from mind to mind but from 
person to person, by historical acts of communication of the kind that we call 
divine revelation. The superior understanding of the universe that emerged in 
ancient Israel seems have to have been gained in some considerable measure 
by this means, though the prophets, at least some of them, may have been 
inspired precisely when engaging in enquiry and reflection more or less philo-
sophical. Among those prophets is the great lawgiver who announced to those 
people a ten-proposition law which he did not invent, but also did not find by 
enquiry and reflection, but received by interpersonal communication of infor-
mation when he was away from all his fellowmen on the mountain in southern 
Sinai, east of Egypt’s Red Sea.
Since that time, especially since that set of Ten Commandments was rat-
ified and distinguished from all other Mosaic legislation by the Rabbi from 
Galilee and by Peter and Paul and his other close followers in the Assembly at 
Jerusalem in 49 A.D., it has become possible and necessary to speak of natural 
law in a new sense: natural law as distinct from divinely revealed law. Natural 
moral law can be known by people of all times and places by natural rationality 
in reflection on ourselves, our neighbours, our opportunities and so on and so 
forth. Revealed moral law can be known only by those to whom there has been 
handed on the information that was, in fact, imparted, mind to mind and per-
son to person, in some historically located activities of divine revelation, for 
example to Moses, and for another and decisive example in the teaching and 
example of the Rabbi from Nazareth. The content of this revelation should be 
distinguished from the fact of revelation, which is a fact that, in relation to rev-
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elation’s decisive phase of revelation – adding to but confirming the authen-
ticity of the earlier phases – is open to the investigations of enquiring natural 
reason. Such an investigation, as is implied by this address’s first thesis, seeks 
truth about events and intentions, like in a criminal investigation or truthful 
biography, in order to judge, with care and honesty, honorably, whether there 
was or was not in those days and months an authentic communication from 
the divine and personal Creator.
As I have already indicated briefly, the distinction between natural and 
revealed law needs to be understood with care. The community of believers 
founded by the Rabbi and his close followers the apostles teaches, perhaps 
uniquely, that the propositional content of the revealed moral law is the same 
as the content of the natural moral law accessible to people who have not 
heard or believed the revelation. Revelation does not subtract any of that con-
tent of natural law, but rather gives it a new clarity and certainty.
Of course, beyond the domain of natural moral law, revelation offers a 
wealth of new information, information that could never have been discov-
ered by enquiry into and reflection on the natural world as it came from the 
pre-revelatory acts of the Creator and as it exists in accordance with the corre-
sponding laws of nature – of physics, chemistry, biology and so forth. The new 
information concerns, above all, a new singularity, a new, final and supernat-
ural stage of Creation. It tells us that the Creator somehow will take, beyond 
this universe, into divine existence and life itself, all those human persons who 
explicitly or implicitly choose to participate in this final stage of Creation, 
the Creator’s «kingdom» coming and to come (including, it seems, all who, 
without ever hearing this good news, had or have hearts – wills – equivalently 
open to the divine will). This is indeed a stage of Creation, and an opportu-
nity, beyond what is naturally foreseeable. So how does it relate to the natural 
law that is my subject this morning?
In the documents of this revelation, the course of human history and 
destiny is depicted in various ways. One of them is by depiction of three 
gardens. In the historical parable of chapters 2.4 through 3 of the book of 
Genesis there is the garden «in the east» in which the first truly human, ra-
tional, personal creatures lose an immortality (and undying intimacy with 
the Creator) that was not yet given to them and yet was somehow in pros-
pect as a fruit not yet eaten of a Tree of Life divinely planted in the midst 
of the garden alongside a Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, a forbidden 
knowledge or experience of choosing and enjoying whatever one wills, even 
what one knows to be against the supremely wise will and intention of the 
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Creator of all goods including all true knowledge. It is in parable a history 
of the willful and personal assumption of responsibility, a choice by each 
individual, partly (as we ought to choose) out of friendship and trust in each 
other, and yet wrongfully, because chosen (as we never ought to) out of dis-
belief in the wisdom and goodness of the Creator’s word and precept. That 
true account by parable of the ever-repeated history of human wrongdoing 
freely chosen is placed at the beginning of the revelation’s Library (Βιβλια) 
as a prophecy that the new, final and supernatural stage of Creation must 
await the gradual moral education of human families and societies, and then 
a new divine gift.
 And the second garden, in revelation’s depiction? The final stage of Cre-
ation awaited, above all, the intervention in history of a human being whose 
life, from its very inception at conception, has been assumed into the Crea-
tor’s divine life and thus has been and is the life of a person who is both truly 
human and truly divine, a single person who is double in nature, life and will, 
and who in his agonizing personal human trial of conscience and will, at night 
in the garden below the eastern wall of Jerusalem in early April 33 AD – in 
full knowledge that apprehension and execution awaits him within a day if he 
remains faithful to his mission – chooses that fidelity (and accepts, as side-ef-
fect, its lethal consequences). The words in which he articulated that choice 
– words actually overheard by one or more of his disciples, or later recounted 
by him to them 3 – express his reversal of the fault and separation first com-
mitted in the earlier «garden in the east»: «Father... not what I will, but what 
you will» 4.
And then, in the very last scene portrayed for us in the Library of di-
vine revelation, there is, in the new Jerusalem, a whole garden of Trees of 
Life planted on either side of the river of the water of life that flows through 
that holy city «come down from heaven». 5 A part of what that parable-vision 
communicates is the immortal life available to those who are willing to do 
the will of the Creator to the end, and not available to any who loves or does 
falsehood 6. The correlation between the will of the Creator and the natural 
3 Vid., Luke 24. 44-46; Acts 1. 3-5.
4 Mark 14. 26; Matthew 26. 39 and 42; Luke 22. 42; and see John 4. 34; 5. 30; 6. 38.
5 Revelation 22. 1-2; 21. 2; in the whole Bible, the last previous reference to the tree of life was in 
Genesis 3. 24. In Rev 22. 1-2 the reference to the garden is pictorial, not verbal. 
6 Rev 22. 3, 14-15.
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moral law is as close and tight as the correlation between defying the natural 
law and «doing falsehood».
The other part of what is conveyed by the parable-vision of the «new 
Jerusalem» – the part that perhaps is more certainly intended by whichever 
John 7 was its human author – is the separating out from the old Israel (and 
old covenant between God and Israel) of the new people (and new covenant), 
the people of the new ekklesia, the assembly, the church established on the 
foundation of the Twelve who were the closest followers of the Rabbi and eye-
witnesses of his preaching, his death and his rising, bodily but already trans-
figured, from among the dead. This new assembly has now the custody of 
the revelation and of its library or biblia, and of the storehouse of helps to all 
people everywhere to participate in the new creation, the last and supernatu-
ral (miraculous) phase of Creation which will continue, without extinction of 
persons, into God’s eternity even as, and after, the old Creation begun by the 
Big Bang succumbs as it naturally must to entropy, loss of information, and 
finally to inertness if not extinction.
Viii. seCulaR anD sPiRitual Communities aRe DistinCt anD 
ResPeCtFully selF-goVeRning
A part of the revelation, closely based on the famous saying of the Rabbi 
about what does and does not belong as of right to «Caesar», is the following. 
Civil or political or state power and authority, on the one hand, and spiritual 
or ecclesiastical authority and power, on the other hand, are distinct, and in-
deed separate – separate communities each complete in its own way – such 
that under ideal conditions of discovery everyone would be a member of both 
(though membership of the ekklesia is entirely voluntary), but neither of these 
complete communities is entitled to be the governing internal manager of the 
other.
So, the remainder of this address sets aside the revealed information 
about the new creation, and the ecclesiastical community organized on its 
basis and to promote it. It will speak only of civil societies and of the political 
community, the state with its governing organs and law, and of the rights and 
7 Vid., Rev 1. 4, 9 (quite possibly John who was called Mark: Acts 12, 25; 13. 5, 13; 15. 38-9; 1 Pet. 
5. 13; 2 Tim. 4. 10; Col. 4. 10; Philemon 24; perhaps also 2 Cor. 8. 18-21).
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duties that the state’s government and law are morally authorized to promote, 
protect and vindicate by state law.
But before we set aside that ecclesiastical community, complete in its 
own right and in its own way, one should not fail to notice that its existence 
and legitimate authority helped to cast doubt upon Plato and Aristotle’s be-
lief that the moral, natural law authority of state law and government to make 
and enforce positive laws extends to laws which are parental or, in a modern 
idiom, «paternalistic». A «paternalistic» law prohibits specified private ac-
tivity in the hope that the prohibition will deter, dissuade or convert some 
or many or all who are tempted to engage in such activity by their own free 
and adult choice, and thus rescue them from damaging themselves, morally 
at least, by engaging in conduct of the kind specified in the law as «harmful». 
A sound natural law theory of governance of states in modern conditions 
will differ sharply from Aristotelean theories which presuppose that there is 
only one complete community, the political, and that its role is to bring each 
and all its adult citizens to complete fulfilment and moral virtue, and which 
therefore treat as a legitimate end of government and legislation the saving 
of people from the moral, spiritual harm each inflicts on himself or herself 
when he or she chooses to engage in acts that are harmful to him or her and 
not, or not directly, to others. For a sound natural law theory – one such 
as Thomas Aquinas developed knowing that there is another, non-political 
community which has the role of bringing all its members and ideally all the 
state’s citizens to complete fulfilment and virtue – will judge that the state’s 
government and law, since it does not have that role, properly exercises coer-
cive jurisdiction only in relation to acts and words which impact negatively 
not, or not only, on the acting person, but on persons other than himself. 
Government and law, in such a theory, should be informed by a true under-
standing of natural law and indeed, if possible, of the truths of supernatural 
revelation and destiny. Such knowledge will assist it in many ways, without 
conferring on its jurisdiction to enact and enforce laws prohibiting purely 
private self-regarding, self-affecting acts or omissions. That, as I say, is the 
thesis of Thomas Aquinas 8, often misunderstood by very many of his follow-
ers over the centuries, who assumed he was more completely a follower of 
Aristotle than what in fact he was.
8 Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, Ch. VII., 2-6, Oxford University Press, 
England, 1998.
JOHN FINNIS
36 PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 82 / 2020/1
ix. natuRal moRal laW DeFines human Rights but RightFully 
extenDs beyonD them
Precepts of justice direct us to abstain from acts and omissions that injure 
another person or persons. Precepts of justice, Which Aquinas already held, 
have as their object, their point and rationale, the other person or persons’ 
right, that is, what the other person is entitled to from the person who has the 
duty – a duty which (using language that is not Aquinas’s) we can therefore say 
is correlative to that right. So (Aquinas goes on) the appropriate definition of 
justice is the disposition to give or render to another or others their right or 
rights. That is already, essentially, the modern conception of a right: to have 
a right is to be the beneficiary of a duty imposed by some law or principle, 
whether of state law or of natural law.
A later idiom for saying the same things speaks of the natural rights that 
natural moral laws entail, and a still more recent idiom for the same propo-
sitions talks of human rights. If human rights are formulated or understood 
without strict regard to the individual duties that are their correlatives, they 
are merely programmatic assertions of a benefit or interest that is claimed to 
be important, yet claimed without sufficient care to specify a correlative duty, 
or to specify who has such a duty. Talk of human rights is important and true 
only when it is accompanied by care to identify the person or persons who has 
or have the correlative burden – of doing or abstaining from doing something 
specific, the doing or omission of which affects a specifiable individual or class 
of individuals in a manner, and to a degree, that is contrary to some applicable 
precept of true morality.
The clearest and most certain human, natural, natural-law rights are 
those in which a basic human good is closely and directly at stake, that is, 
where there is a clear and certain duty not to choose to destroy, damage or im-
pede a person’s participation in that good. The most obvious examples are the 
right to life – not to be intentionally killed, or to be mutilated (as distinct from 
undergoing amputation for the sake of one’s survival or overall health) – and 
the right of A to marry B who is someone willing to marry A and who together 
could engage in marital relations, relations on which might supervene a child 
whose true parents would be A and B.
But there is important moral (natural-law) truths which are not immedi-
ately expressed as natural or human rights. Important examples of these truths 
relate to the desirability and suitability of appropriating parts of the world’s 
surface to specific peoples to be their territory to the exclusion of other peo-
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ples and persons save by leave. The national or state territory of China, or of 
the political community known as the United Kingdom, are examples. The 
desirability and suitability of that kind of appropriation is closely similar to 
the desirability and suitability of appropriating parts of a political communi-
ty’s resources to particular individuals or families for them to control manage, 
develop, use and enjoy the produce within a framework of law. Such law, if 
just, directly or indirectly ensures that while these owners or lawful possessors 
have the initiative and priority in control, and a right of exclusion of others, 
their rights are subject to a duty of sharing of the fruits or profits whenever 
these exceed a level appropriate broadly to their reasonable vocations as indi-
viduals or families, and a duty of sharing in severe emergencies, and a liability 
to be expropriated for the purposes of public works, with just compensation. 
Legally defined rights of property have a strong relevance to the wellbeing 
of everyone on the territory, and often to the wellbeing of sort of dependant 
persons outside the territory. But no one comes into existence with a prior 
right to some specific part of the world’s or their country’s resources. So it 
is difficult to identify a natural or human right to private property, beyond a 
generic right that one’s rulers and fellow citizens deliberate and choose with 
responsibility, honesty and care about the advantages and costs of adopting 
and maintaining a stable legal order of property rights aligned to the genuine 
interests of families and local communities, not forgetting the national and 
international interest in the development and resultant relative prosperity of 
all who can benefit from the efficiencies of management and productivity that 
very regularly tend to result from stable legal appropriation to private persons 
or associations.
Like the genuine benefits to everyone that tend to result from the stable 
national sovereignty over defined territory, in preference to a cosmopolitan 
right of every individual and group to migrate to any part of the world at their 
choice, these benefits of legal appropriation of resources to nations, and with-
in nations to persons and other entities, are not merely material or measura-
ble as Gross National Product, family wealth, or the like. They include also, 
and very importantly, the benefits and dignity of self-direction or self-govern-
ment, the non-servile status of independence over time, such that the fruits of 
past care and cultivation and culture are cherished not for hoarding but for the 
benefit of present and future generations. This cultural capital, to call it so, in-
cludes expectations and tolerances, languages and mutual intelligibility, works 
and modes of literature and other fine arts, accessible and honest history of 
one’s family, one’s neighborhood, one’s worshipping community, one’s edu-
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cational institutions, one’s regiment, one’s country, and indeed humankind. 
It should be a cultural capital lived in by a people open to true information, 
including information from the Creator whose natural creative information 
has made and continues providentially to make all these good things possible 
and attainable.
That transcendent providence in its working out proceeds according to 
standards and norms that we do not now know, and includes obstacles, de-
ficiencies, and ills the point of which we do not understand. But the infor-
mation that we do share in by natural reason, clarified and supplemented by 
historically given and authenticated revelation, gives us reason to think that, 
in the providential wisdom of the Creator of nature and of our natures, all will 
prove to have been for the ultimate benefit of each one of us, in diverse ways, 
and if not now then in His eternity, which each of us, responsible for his or her 
own free choices, faces one by one.
